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Abstract
In a great majority of countries throughout the world productive gov-
ernment services have declined as percentage of GDP since the 1970s.
In the macroeconomic literature this is often associated with the gen-
eral productivity growth decline, suggesting an important role for in-
frastructure investment in economic growth. However, this also raises
the question as of why public capital spending declined in so many
countries. Surprisingly, hardly any research on this exists. This paper
is one of the first attempts to fill this gap by testing various hypotheses
that may explain the development of government capital spending us-
ing panel data for 123 non-OECD countries for the period 1970–1998.
Politico-institutional variables, like ideology, political cohesion, po-
litical stability and political business cycles do not seem to be impor-
tant when explaining government capital formation in less-developed
economies. On the other hand, variables like public deficits, private
investment and foreign aid are significantly related to public capital
spending.
1 Introduction
There is a large literature on the determinants of private investment in less-
developed countries. Two explanations for this interest can be put forward.
First, recent empirical studies for developing countries have found positive,
significant and robust effects of increases in investment ratio on economic
∗Comments from Jakob de Haan and participants of the ECB workshop on ‘Public
Investment and Growth’, Monday 11 June 2001 in Frankfurt, are greatly appreciated.
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growth.1 In fact, Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Sturm
and De Haan (2000) found that the ratio to GDP of total investment is
among a few variables that are robustly correlated with growth for a diverse
group of countries. This raises the question as of why the investment ratios
across countries differ so much. Secondly, the debt crisis in the early 1980s
have triggered the interest in the ‘debt overhang’ hypothesis. In general
those studies have found support for the adverse effects of the debts service
and debt overhang on private investment.2
In principal similar arguments can be made for public investment. How-
ever, on the determinants of publicly funded investment in less-developed
countries hardly any research has been conducted. This lack of analysis is es-
pecially surprising, as in a great majority of countries throughout the world
productive government services have declined as percentage of GDP since
the 1970s. At the same time productivity growth plummeted worldwide.
In his seminal work, Aschauer (1989) has hypothesized that this decrease
in productive government services is crucial in explaining the general pro-
ductivity growth decline. This hypothesis has received great attention in
the literature ever since.3 Many economists nowadays believe that there is
an important role for infrastructure investment in economic growth. The
implications for policymakers seem to be clear: public investment should go
up to give a boost to the economy. Indeed, in many countries politicians
of various political origins and international institutes like the World Bank
and IMF support such policies. This raises the question, however, as of why
public capital spending has declined in so many countries.
Using panel data for 123 non-OECD countries for the period 1970–1998
we test various hypotheses that may explain the development of government
capital spending. We classify the hypotheses in three classes: structural,
economic and politico-instititutional. The remainder of this paper is orga-
nized as follows. Section 2 describes the development of government capital
spending in most developing countries over the period 1970–1998. The third
section reviews previous studies on determinants of public capital invest-
ment, formulates the hypotheses and describes our variables. The fourth
1See, e.g. Ghura (1995), Ghura and Hadjimichael (1995), Savvides (1995), De Gregorio
(1991), Barro (1991), Fischer (1991), Khan and Kumar (1993), and Khan and Reinhart
(1990).
2See, e.g. Solimano (1989), Borensztein (1990a,b), Green and Villanueva (1991), O¨zler
and Rodrik (1992), Cardoso (1993), Larrain and Vergara (1993), Serve´n and Solimano
(1993), Sakr (1993) and Oshikoya (1994). ‘Debt overhang’ occurs when high external debt
leads agents to anticipate future tax liabilities, thereby constraining current investment.
3For an extensive survey see Sturm (1998, Chapter 4).
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section presents our estimation results and the final section summarizes the
paper.
2 Government capital spending
Figures 1 and 2 show central government capital expenditure as a share of
GDP for respectively 123 and 37 countries over the period 1970–1998. Cap-
ital expenditure is spending of the central government only to acquire fixed
capital assets, land, intangible assets, government stocks, and nonmilitary,
nonfinancial assets. This also includes capital grants. The data have been
taken from the 2000 World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM pub-
lished by the World Bank. They represent the most comprehensive expen-
diture series available on a comparable basis for a broad range of countries.
Figure 1 shows yearly averages and medians of the share of central gov-
ernment spending in GDP for a total of 123 countries. As we do not have
data on all countries for all years the yearly samples differ substantially.
The area on the background depicts the number of countries included in
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each sample. For a maximum of 81 countries data is available in the year
1985. As part of the volatility in the graph might be due to these unbalanced
samples, figure 2 shows a similar graph in case we restrict our attention to
the largest balanced sample possible, i.e. for 37 less-developed countries
covering the 1975–1993 period.
We would like to stress two observations from these two figures. First,
since the mid 1970s there seems to be a clear decline in the share of central
government capital expenditure. Of course there are exceptions, but for 70
percent of the countries for which data is available, we find lower numbers
in the 1990–1995 period than in the 1975–1980 period.
Second, the average and median get closer over time, implying conver-
gence of public capital spending shares across these countries. Or, countries
which had large shares of central government expenditures in the 1970s have
decreased spending at faster rates than countries with already relatively low
shares.
However, what these figures cannot reveal is that central government
capital spending varies considerably across countries. As this might partly
be due to institutional differences, e.g. countries might differ quit a bit in
4
their shares of public investment by local vs. central governments, we will
cope with this by including country fixed effects in the regressions.
3 Hypotheses
Except for the work of De Haan et al. (1996), who concentrate on OECD
countries, there are, to the best of our knowledge, no panel studies explaining
government capital spending. However, some authors have estimated time-
series models for government investment spending for European countries.
These studies have been summarized by De Haan et al. (1996) and Lybeck
(1988). All studies are based upon various hypotheses put forward in the
literature to explain government growth. Unfortunately, the various studies
are fragmented and cannot be combined into a coherent theory. At best,
they allow us to derive a number of more or less conflicting hypotheses.
Following Kirchga¨ssner and Pommerehne (1988) we distinguish three sets of
explanatory variables:
Structural variables: degree of urbanization (URBPOP), population growth
(GRPOP).
Economic variables: real economic growth (GRGDP), government bud-
get deficits (DEFGDP), government debt (CGDBTGDP), interest pay-
ment of government (INTPAYGDP), private investment (GDFICAPGDP),
foreign aid (AIDGNP), openness (TRADEGDP), foreign direct invest-
ment (FDIGDP).
Politico-institutional variables: ideology (EXECNAT, EXECREG, EX-
ECL, EXECR), electoral cycles (EXELEC), coalition variables (IP-
COH), Economic and political freedom (CIVLIB, POLRGHT), polit-
ical instability (STABNS2).
The remainder of this section will review the reasons given by various authors
to include these explanatory variables into a model explaining government
capital spending.
Most studies explaining government size include the so-called structural
variables to test for Wagner’s law, especially in the version that stresses the
transformation of the traditional society into the industrialized society with
its shift from the family to the public sector of services like education and
health care (Lybeck, 1988). The inclusion of the urbanization level can be
interpreted in such a way, leading us to expect a positive sign. However,
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in case of government capital spending there is also another demand-side
reason for including the degree of urbanization. Most public capital spending
concern infrastructure, and rural areas are in relatively more need of those.
Hence, we hypothesize that a larger degree of urbanization will lead to less
demand for infrastructure.4 In a similar way, a growing population might
increase demand.
Inflation and unemployment are generally included to take cyclical factors
into account. In case of counter-cyclical policy one may expect public spend-
ing to be restrained when inflation accelerates and to be increased with rising
unemployment levels (Aubin et al., 1988). Alternatively, the growth rate of
real GDP can be used. Note that this reason for including GDP in the model
differs from the conventional motivation, which is to test for Wagner’s law
(see, e.g. Henrekson, 1988), especially in the version that stresses the fact
that many goods and services provided by government have a high income
elasticity of demand.
The government budget deficit is often included to test for fiscal illu-
sion. Again, interpretation problems may arise in case of government capital
spending. It is often stated that governments should be allowed to borrow
for public capital spending because of the redistributive effect over genera-
tions.5
High levels of budget deficits and/or government debt may lead to restric-
tive fiscal policy measures. Large debt interest payments crowd out other
government spending categories. Countries might have offset increases in
debt interest payments by winding back public capital spending. According
to Oxley and Martin (1991) this pattern reflects “the political reality that
it is easier to cut back or postpone investment spending than it is to cut
current expenditures”. Very often it is maintained that in periods of fiscal
consolidation government investment is an easy target. Roubini and Sachs
(1989b, pp. 108–109) argue that “in periods of restrictive fiscal policies and
fiscal consolidation capital expenditures are the first to be reduced (often
drastically) given that they are the least rigid component of expenditures”.
De Haan et al. (1996) report evidence in favor of this hypothesis for a large
group of OECD countries in the 1980s.
Another hypothesis we will examine is whether private investment influ-
ences government capital spending, either because both types of investment
4Another similar variable is the initial per capita income in the previous period. The
correlation between the degree of urbanization and per capita income—after correcting
for country-specific effects—is quite high and equals 0.73.
5However, it is not clear how often this policy is officially pursued in our large group
of less-developed countries.
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are substitutes or move in tandem.
Besides alleviating immediate catastrophes, foreign aid is mostly in-
tended to help create a better environment for sustainable economic growth.
Donations are often restricted in their use to for instance improving infras-
tructure.
More open economies often are more vulnerable to foreign competition
and compete for business by offering, among other things, adequate infras-
tructure. In a similar vein, to attract foreign direct investment a government
could increase public capital spending.
A factor that has been treated extensively in the literature on public sec-
tor growth is the possibility that governments of a socialist (or social-
democratic) persuasion tend to increase public expenditures at a faster rate
than right-wing governments. Indeed, there are various studies (including
Cameron, 1978, Roubini and Sachs, 1989b and De Haan and Sturm, 1994)
that report evidence supporting these so-called Partisan cycles. However,
Henrekson (1988) has pointed out that there is a problem with linking pub-
lic sector size and the ‘colour’ of the party in power. The attitudes towards
public expenditures of different parties may depend on what kind of ex-
penditure is at issue. Parties of the right may, for instance, be in favour of
higher spending on defence and police, whereas parties of the left may favour
spending of a social welfare character. Van Dalen and Swank (1995) report
evidence that spending on infrastructure in the Netherlands was higher un-
der right-wing governments than under left-wing governments.6 In line with
the approach of these authors we test whether governments which are domi-
nated by left-wing parties are more willing to cut investment spending than
are right-wing governments. Another ideological issue might be the back-
ground of the political party in power. Rural or regional parties might be
more inclined to provide infrastructure than other parties.
It has also been argued by various authors that the kind of government
(coalition, majority government or minority government) may influence both
government debt accumulation (Grilli et al., 1991) and the level of govern-
ment spending (Roubini and Sachs, 1989b). The reasoning is that large
coalition and minority governments may have more difficulties in reaching
agreement to balance the budget (De Haan and Sturm, 1997). In that case,
government investment spending will again be a more easy spending cate-
gory to cut. However, Henrekson (1988) argues that a larger number of par-
ties may increase the likelihood that an agreement between a party and an
6However, Sturm and De Haan (1998) do not find any evidence for this for the Nether-
lands.
7
interest group is reached. In his model for Swedish government investment
he therefore included a coalition dummy which turned out to be significantly
negative, which is in line with the hypothesis of Roubini and Sachs. Hence,
we hypothesize that politically weak governments are more inclined to cut
capital formation spending than are politically strong governments.
To test for political business cycle considerations electoral cycles are
taken into account in some studies (Nordhaus, 1975). Van Dalen and Swank
(1995) found, for instance, that elections are important in explaining infras-
tructure spending in the Netherlands. Schuknecht (2000) concludes that in
particular public investment is used as an instrument to influence election
outcomes in a group of 24 developing countries. Furthermore, Bates (1988)
and Krueger and Turan (1993) show that public investment cycles have in-
deed been popular in respectively Zambia and Turkey. We will therefore
also included an election variable in our model.
Economic and political liberalizations might give the private sector more
room for own initiatives and lead the government to retract. Hence, we
hypothesize that governments of more democratic countries will spend less
on infrastructure.
Another hypothesis that we will test is that myopic governments will cut
capital spending more than governments which have a longer policy horizon.
As the benefits of investment spending generally do not show up in the short-
run, myopic policymakers will be inclined to cut capital spending. It is our
contention that the percent of veto players who drop from the government
may be a good proxy for the time-horizon of policymakers (see also De Haan
and Sturm, 1994).
Note that some issues which mainly explain the cross-sectional differ-
ences are not taken up in the analysis. For instance, electoral rules and
federalism are not listed above. These and other institutional variables will
be captured by the country-specific fixed effects allowed for in the econo-
metric specifications.
4 Estimation results
Table 1 summarizes the data used. All structural and economic variables
stem from the 2000 World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM. Un-
less mentioned otherwise, the political indicators are extracted from the
Database of Political Institutions, Version 2 as collected and described by
Beck et al. (1999).
Our testing approach goes as follows. We start with a basic model to
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Series Obs Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum
CAPGDP 1725 5.93 4.97 0.10 40.85
URBPOP 1725 45.99 23.66 3.84 100.00
GRPOP 1725 2.26 1.51 -4.54 18.02
GRGDP 1725 3.73 5.76 -30.76 29.44
DEFGDP 1700 3.46 5.94 -58.71 31.63
CGDBTGDP 1022 50.29 47.01 0.44 447.34
INTPAYGDP 1542 2.60 2.84 0.00 27.03
GDFICAPGDP 1566 16.92 7.96 0.05 66.84
AIDGNP 1655 5.66 8.02 -0.57 69.71
TRADEGDP 1680 76.92 53.65 2.15 439.03
FDIGDP 1581 1.74 3.47 -24.03 33.44
EXECNAT 1497 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
EXECREG 1497 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
EXECL 1385 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
EXECR 1385 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
EXELEC 1497 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
PRESIPCOH0 1496 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
PRESIPCOH1 1496 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00
PARLIPCOH0 1496 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
PARLIPCOH1 1496 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
PARLIPCOH2 1496 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
PARLIPCOH3 1496 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
CIVLIB 1700 4.13 1.62 1.00 7.00
POLRGHT 1700 4.06 1.98 1.00 7.00
STABNS2 1509 0.11 0.28 0.00 1.00
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Table 2: Structural variables
Exp.var. (1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPGDP1 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.66
(37.19) (35.94) (37.14) (35.93)
GRGDP 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04





Adj.R2 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
No.obs. 1725 1725 1725 1725
No.Cntrs 118 118 118 118
No.Yrs 28 28 28 28
which various variables are added to test the hypotheses outlined in the
previous section. The explanatory variables in the basic model are the lagged
dependent variable—to capture the persistence in public capital spending
over time— and the growth rate of real GDP—to correct for cyclical effects.
These variables have been selected on the basis of the time-series models and
on their robustness in the regressions. To capture institutional differences,
the model is estimated with fixed country effects. Column (1) of Table
2 shows the basic model. All explanatory variables have the theoretically
expected sign and are highly significant. Next we add potential structural,
economic and politico-institutional variables. In case we find some of these
variables robustly related to central government capital spending, the base
model will be expanded.
4.1 Structural variables
Column (2) of Table 2 adds the degree of urbanization to the model. The
negative sign of the degree of urbanization suggests that rural economies
require higher levels of public capital spending.
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Population growth does not seem to effect public capital spending (Columns
(3) and (4) of Table 2). This variable is never significant whatever model we
specify. For instance, lagging the variables or restricting the sample to the
largest balanced group possible still renders an insignificant coefficient of
population growth, whereas the degree of urbanization remains significant
(not shown).
Given the significance and robustness of the urbanization level, we opt
to include it into our base model.7
4.2 Economic variables
Next we explore the economic hypotheses put forward in the previous sec-
tion. Table 3 starts by including the government budget deficit. This vari-
able is highly significant and has a positive sign indicating that increased
capital spending is at least partly deficit financed. To further explore this is-
sue the next column shows the results in case budget deficits of the previous
period is also taken into account. The lagged deficits are highly significant
but of the opposite sign. Large deficits in the past lowers capital spending
in the future.8
Central government debt is significantly negative in Column (3) of Ta-
ble 3, despite the inclusion of the lagged deficit variable.9 Hence, high debt
makes freeing up funds for capital spending more difficult. Interest payments
of the government do not significantly explain public capital spending (Col-
umn (4) of Table 3).10 The conclusion does not change if central government
debt is also included (Column (5) of Table 3).
Note that the degrees of freedom drop by nearly a third in the models
in which central government debt is included (Columns (3) and (5) of Table
3). Nevertheless the coefficients of the other variables and their significance
levels stay roughly the same.11
7Replacing the degree of urbanization by lagged GDP per capita does not qualita-
tively change any of these and following conclusions. Due to collinearity (see footnote 4),
including both at the same time leads to both being insignificant at conventional levels.
8In case only the lagged deficit variable is included the same result applies.
9Without the lagged deficit variable its significance rises further.
10Removing the lagged deficit variable makes interest payment significant at the 10 per
cent level with the expected negative sign.
11In less-developed economies most central government debt is part of external debt.
In practice the correlation between both variables is 81.5 per cent for our sample of
countries, and 0.76 if corrected for country-specific effects. Hence, besides problem in the
interpretation, including both in one model would lead to multicollinearity problems. We
therefore restrict our attention to central government debt.
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Table 3: Economic variables
Exp.var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CAPGDP1 0.62 0.68 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.70 0.64 0.67 0.66 0.61
(33.74) (37.06) (24.12) (33.06) (24.00) (38.34) (34.37) (36.03) (33.79) (22.31)
GRGDP 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
(5.51) (5.48) (3.60) (5.61) (3.58) (5.88) (5.46) (5.49) (5.74) (4.45)
URBPOP -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(-3.44) (-3.69) (-4.28) (-3.89) (-4.28) (-3.37) (-3.50) (-4.15) (-3.13) (-2.40)
DEFGDP 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.19
(10.03) (14.88) (11.61) (14.07) (11.16) (12.28) (15.61) (15.08) (14.92) (10.98)
DEFGDP1 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.12
(-12.06) (-8.26) (-10.83) (-7.94) (-11.44) (-11.85) (-11.51) (-10.96) (-6.67)














Adj.R2 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.87
No.obs. 1700 1695 1022 1533 988 1524 1625 1651 1558 907
No.Cntrs 118 118 89 111 87 112 117 117 111 83
No.Yrs 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
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Next we have added private investment spending as explanatory variable
(Column (6) of Table 3). This variable has been constructed by substracting
from the gross domestic fixed investment series the public capital spending
series. Its contemporaneous coefficient is significantly negative, suggesting
these two series behave as substitutes. Lagging private investment, how-
ever, reveals a significantly positive relationship.12 Hence, public investment
seems to follow private investment over time, whereas it crowds out private
investment in any given year.
Foreign aid is added in Column (7) of Table 3. Additional foreign aid
leads to larger spending of the government on capital. The same holds for
the openness of a country (Column (8) of Table 3). Countries which see their
shares of imports and exports increase spend more on public capital. Net
foreign direct investment, however, does not help explaining public capital
spending (Column (9) of Table 3).13,14
Column (10) of Table 3 includes all significant variables at once.15 As
follows, our basic conclusions do not change.16
4.3 Politico-institutional variables
We opt to use two different base models when checking the politico-institutional
hypotheses: a parsimonious and comprehensive specification. Base model
(1) includes only the lagged dependent variable, economic growth, urban-
ization and contemporaneous and lagged government deficits. Base model
(2) also includes central government debt, contemporaneous and lagged pri-
vate investment, foreign aid, and openness. Table 4 reports the results in
case the parsimonious base model is used, whereas Table 5 shows the same
regressions using the comprehensive base model.
We first check whether the ideology of the government plays a significant
role in explaining public capital spending. Columns (1) and (2) of Tables
4 and 5 check the effect of the political ‘colour’. Right-wing government—
denoted by EXECR=1—are formed by parties that are defined as conser-
vative, Christian democratic, liberal (European definition) or simply right-
12Removing contemporaneous or lagged private investment does not change this con-
clusion.
13We also experimented with gross foreign direct investment. The conclusion did not
change.
14Lagging economic growth, urbanization level, foreign aid, openness, or foreign direct
investment does not change any of the conclusions.
15Insignificant variables remain insignificant when included in this extended model.
16These conclusions are robust in case we restrict our attention to the largest balance
sample possible (not shown).
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Table 4: Politico-institutional variables using the parsimonious base model
Exp.var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CAPGDP1 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.67 0.64
(30.28) (30.25) (32.41) (32.41) (32.45) (32.06) (36.52) (36.67) (32.16)
GRGDP 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(5.81) (5.81) (5.70) (5.70) (5.69) (5.67) (5.50) (5.50) (5.64)
URBPOP -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06
(-4.50) (-4.60) (-4.54) (-4.52) (-4.49) (-4.76) (-3.77) (-3.72) (-4.71)
DEFGDP 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20
(14.25) (14.23) (14.65) (14.67) (14.65) (14.62) (14.74) (14.74) (14.49)
DEFGDP1 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16



























Adj.R2 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.87
No.obs. 1360 1360 1472 1472 1472 1471 1670 1670 1483
No.Cntrs 107 107 110 110 110 110 117 117 110
No.Yrs 23 23 23 23 23 23 27 27 23
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wing. Left-wing governments—denoted by EXECL—are formed by parties
that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or simply left-
wing. Columns (3) and (4) include dummies in case the party in power is
listed as respectively nationalist (EXECNAT) or list rural issues as a key
component of the party’s platform (EXECREG).
Neither in the parsimonious base model nor in the comprehensive version
the ideological variables are significant. Hence, we cannot find any evidence
that government ideology seems to matter with respect to public capital
spending.
To check for a political business cycle, we include a dummy capturing
election years (EXELEC) (Column (5)). In contrast to Schuknecht (2000),
who only looks at a group of 24 developing countries, no relationship is
found.17
To capture possible effects of divided versus single-party governments,
we use the Index of Political Cohesion (IPCOH) which is based on Roubini
and Sachs (1989a, 1989b). This variable is defined in the following way:
For presidential systems:
0 same party in control of the executive and legislature (if multiple
pro-presidential parties, they must together control the legisla-
ture)
1 different parties in control of the executive and legislature (if mul-
tiple pro-presidential parties, they must not control legislature)
For parliamentary systems:
0 one-party majority government
1 coalition government with two parties
2 coalition government with three or more parties
3 minority government
As pointed out by Edin and Ohlsson (1991) the construction of this
political cohesion index places a very restrictive form on its effects. Why
should public capital spending under a minority government be three times
as low as under a two-party majority coalition or in case of a presidential
system when different parties are in control of the executive and legislature?
We have therefore constructed a dummy variable for each ‘political class’.
17Lagged or future elections are also not significant (not shown).
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Table 5: Politico-institutional variables using the comprehensive base model
Exp.var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CAPGDP1 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.59
(20.39) (20.40) (21.30) (21.32) (21.35) (21.15) (21.88) (21.62) (21.32)
GRGDP 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
(3.63) (3.60) (4.08) (4.08) (4.08) (4.08) (4.44) (4.43) (4.10)
URBPOP -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05
(-3.23) (-3.35) (-3.23) (-3.22) (-3.19) (-2.52) (-2.72) (-2.72) (-3.24)
DEFGDP 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18
(9.06) (9.00) (10.20) (10.15) (10.21) (9.80) (10.87) (10.88) (10.33)
DEFGDP1 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13
(-6.40) (-6.42) (-7.07) (-7.08) (-7.08) (-6.73) (-6.54) (-6.50) (-7.15)
CGDBTGDP -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-2.75) (-2.79) (-3.35) (-3.35) (-3.38) (-3.13) (-3.19) (-3.20) (-3.35)
GDFICAPGDP -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11
(-5.02) (-5.07) (-6.19) (-6.20) (-6.21) (-6.32) (-5.96) (-5.99) (-6.24)
GDFICAPGDP1 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
(4.75) (4.78) (5.35) (5.35) (5.37) (5.34) (4.45) (4.45) (5.34)
AIDGNP 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(3.90) (3.97) (4.42) (4.42) (4.41) (4.34) (4.38) (4.43) (4.44)
TRADEGDP 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01



























Adj.R2 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.89
No.obs. 741 741 803 803 803 803 898 898 806
No.Cntrs 74 74 77 77 77 77 83 83 78
No.Yrs 23 23 23 23 23 23 27 27 23
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A presidential system in which the same party is in control of the legislature
and the executive is chosen to be the bench mark. Hence, all political
cohesion dummies should be interpreted relative to this. If we concentrate
on the comprehensive model, presidential systems in which different parties
have control of the legislature and the executive (PRESIPCOH1) appear to
significantly spend less on public capital. This is in line with the hypothesis
of Roubini and Sachs (1989b). However, this result is not robust as focusing
on the parsimonious model shows us. For parliamentary systems we do
not find any evidence in favor of the hypothesis. The four dummy variable
(PARLIPCOH0, PARLIPCOH1, PARLIPCOH2, PARLIPCOH3) are not
significantly different from each other.
We use Gastil’s ranking of countries with respect to their democratic
character. The survey’s regular publication by Freedom House provides
useful and consistent time series. Gastil has created two measures of lib-
erty: political liberty (POLRGHT) and civil liberty (CIVLIB). Both are
ranked from 1 (the highest degree of liberty) to 7 (the lowest). The political
rights rankings are based on the degree to which individuals in a state have
control over those who govern. The civil rights rankings purport to measure
the rights of the individual (e.g. independence of the judiciary, freedom of
the press, freedom of assembly and demonstration, freedom of political or-
ganisation, free trade unions, free religious institutions). The measures are
available from 1973 onwards.
We do not have a measure of economic freedom on a yearly basis. The
most commonly used yardstick is constructed by Gwartney et al. (1996)
and published on a five-year interval. De Haan and Sturm (2001) show that
the level of democracy and economic freedom is highly correlated. Hence,
we presume that Gastil’s measures for democracy also proxy for economic
freedom.
Columns (7) and (8) of Tables 4 and 4 show that neither CIVLIB nor
POLRGHT is significant. In Table 5 both variables do not even have the
expected positive sign.18
The variable STABNS2 counts the percent of veto players who drop
from the government in any given year. Veto players are defined as fol-
lows: for presidential systems, the veto players are the president, the largest
government party, and the largest party in the Senate; for parliamentary sys-
tems, veto players are defined as the Prime Minister and the biggest three
coalition members.19 Using the parsimoneous base model, the coefficient of
18We do not find any significant relationship either when using five-year averages and
the economic freedom indicator of Gwartney et al. (1996).
19If the is no legislatuture, an unelected legislature, an elected legislature with only 1
17
this variable is significantly different from zero at a 10 per cent significance
level. This result is, however, not robust, as the comprehensive model shows
us.20,21
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, a model is estimated to examine whether various hypothe-
ses put forward to explain the downward trends in public capital spending
are supported by the data. Using panel data for up to 123 less-developed
countries for the period 1970–1998, the following hypotheses are tested:
(1) Capital spending is increased during periods of increased economic
growth. Apparantly governments in developing countries do not use
capital spending as a tool for counter-cyclical policy. The positive re-
lationship can be interpreted as evidence in favour of Wagner’s law,
i.e. infrastructure has a high income elasticity of demand.
(2) Increased urbanization lead to less demand for public capital spend-
ing. Rural areas need relatively more spending on infrastructure as
compared to urbanized areas.
(3) Public capital spending appear to be largely financed by increasing
deficits. However, high deficits in the past decrease public capital
spending in the present.
(4) Related to the previous point, highly indebted governments spend less
on public capital. Apparently in case of fiscal stringency, government
capital spending is an easy target for cuts.
(5) Contemporaneous private investment and public capital spending be-
have as substitutes. Lagged private investment, however, has a stim-
ulating effect on public capital spending.
candidate or 1 party in year t-1, then STABNS2 in year t is based only on changes in the
chief executive.
20One may express some doubt whether our variable STABNS2 is a good proxy for
the political stability and therefore the time horizon of policymakers if measured on an
annual basis. Therefore, we have also estimated the model using five-year averages instead
of annual observations. We find no significant effect.
21We also experimented with other measures for political instability. These are the
number of assassinations, strikes, guerilla problems, government crises, purge, riots, revo-
lutions, and anti-government demonstrations. The source is Sierman (1998) and the data
cover the period up to 1994. None of these variables is significant in any of the regressions.
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(6) Foreign aid positively affect government spending on public capital.
(7) Increased openness of an economy leads to increased investment in pub-
lic capital.
(8) Politico-institutional variables, like ideology, political cohesion, polit-
ical stability and political business cycles do not seem to be impor-
tant when explaining government capital spending in less-developed
economies.
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